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Introduction: Evolutionary Dynamics and Complex Adaptive Landscapes 
 
 
 Notions of Darwinian selection have been implicit in economic theory for at least sixty years.  Richard 
Nelson and Sidney Winter note that while evolutionary thinking was prevalent in prewar economics, the 
postwar Neoclassical school became almost entirely preoccupied with equilibrium conditions and their 
mathematical conditions.2  One of the problems with the economic interpretation of firm selection through 
competition has been a weak grasp on an incomplete scientific paradigm.  As I. F. Price relates in his 
review, Organisational Memetics?: Organisational Learning as a Selection Process:3 
 
 The biological metaphor has long lurked in the background of management theory largely because the 
message of survival of the fittest (usually wrongly attributed to Charles Darwin rather than Herbert Spencer) 
provides a seemingly natural model for market competition (e.g. Alchian 1950, Merrell 1984, Henderson 1989, 
Moore 1993), without seriously challenging the underlying paradigms of what an organisation is. More recently 
the new physics of chaos and self-organising systems has stimulated some writers, notably Wheatley (1993), to 
challenge the Newtonian thinking behind the engineering model of the organization 
 
 The difficulty with the Darwinian biological metaphor is that in many cases, self-organization may 
exert a more powerful influence on evolution than selection.  In other cases, change occurs not because of 
selection, but despite selection.4  In particular, through the use of a quantitative model of fitness 
landscapes, Kauffman is able to specify a number of evolutionary characteristics which are quite different 
than those of the Darwinist or Neo-Darwinist paradigm.  The concept of coevolution on a dynamic fitness 
landscape is perhaps the most important from an economic point of view. 
 While the concept of the fitness landscape is not new5 Kauffman was the first to place fitness 
landscapes in a dynamic setting using Boolean networks.6  Kauffman explains rugged fitness landscapes as 
a natural outcome of adaptive evolution:7 
 
 Adaptive evolution occurs largely by the successive accumulation of minor variations in phenotype.  The 
simple example of computer programs makes it clear that not all complex systems are graced with the property 
that a minor change in systemic structure typically leads to minor changes in system behavior.  In short, as their 
internal structure is modified, some systems change behavior relatively smoothly and some relatively 
radically.  Thus we confront the question of whether selective evolution is able to tune 
the structure of complex systems so that they evolve readily, 
 
 The mechanism by which biological systems tune is the result of standard statistical mechanics, 
whereby ensembles move randomly through all phase spaces of the system over time.  With respect to the 
random array of ensemble positions, we might think of economic or business systems which occupy nearby 
positions in a large market with many securities (a densely packed state space).  Borrowing from random 
walk theory we could view the ability of a security to earn economic returns as the measure of its fitness.  
While this is a very simple metaphor it helps to tie the conceptual foundations of economics and finance to 
evolutionary biology in the sense that the elements of both systems can rest in peaks or valleys (in finance 
this would be equivalent to Jensens α , which represents the degree to which management (and by logical 
inference, corporate structure) either creates or destroys value in a firm.  The peaks can be either local 
                                                
2 Nelson, Richard and Winter, Sidney Evolutionary Theorizing in Economics Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 16, No. 2, 
Spring 2002 
3  Price, I. F. Organisational Memetics?: Organisational Learning as a Selection Process, Management Learning, 1995 26: 299-318.  
Price also notes that the emergent discipline of complexity theory, most noticeably expressed in the work of the Santa Fe Institute 
(see Waldrop 1992) and in a recent book by Cohen and Stewart (1994) is revealing the parallels between the processes of self-
organisation in economics, physics, biology, and the simulation of artificial life. 
4 See Kauffman, Stuart The Structure of Rugged Fitness Landscapes in The Origins of Order, Oxford University Press, 1993.  In 
particular, pp.29-31. 
5 Wright, S. (A) Evolution in Mendelian populations,  Genetics, 16 97159, 1931. (B)  The roles of mutation, inbreeding, 
crossbreeding and selection in evolution, .Proceedings Sixth International Congress on Genetics 1 356366 (1932) 
6 Kauffman, S. A. (1969) Metabolic Stability and Epigenesis in Randomly Constructed Genetic Nets. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 
22, pp. 437-467. 
7 Ibid. No. 4 
maxima or global maxima.  In highly efficient markets stocks would reach their equilibrium prices rather 
rapidly and the fitness landscape would be highly correlated.8 
 In less efficient markets, for example markets like the long distance commodities trades we frequently 
see in international business, where there are significant information asymmetries and market 
inefficiencies, the landscape would tend to be rugged and multi-peaked.  In such a situation, there are 
opportunities for large arbitrage (similar to the biologists punctuated equilibrium).9  In the context of a 
dynamic landscape10 where multiple entities interact and both their presence and their interactions affect the 
structure of the landscape, Kauffman argues:11 
 
 The character of adaptive evolution depends on the structure of such fitness landscapes.  Most critically, 
we shall find that, as the complexity of the system under selection increases, selection is progressively less able 
to alter the properties of the system.  Thus, even in the presence of continuing selection, complex systems tend 
to remain typical members of the ensemble of possibilities from which they are drawnThus, if selection, 
when operating on complex systems which spontaneously exhibit profound order, is unable to avoid that 
spontaneous order, that order will shine through.  In short, this theme, central to our concerns, states that much 
of the order in organisms may be spontaneous.  Rather than reflecting selections successes, such order may, 
remarkably reflect selections failure. 
 
Two important points follow from Kauffmans model.  The first is that economic theories  particularly 
equilibrium-oriented theories which model performance as the outcome of selection may have built their 
structure on an internally contradictory foundation from the ground up.12  The second point is more 
technical and has to do with some of the formal mathematical properties NK Boolean networks as well as 
the mathematical limitations that coevolving populations impose on fitness landscapes.  Kauffmans model 
treats adaptive evolution as a search process.13 
 
 Adaptive evolution is a search processdriven by mutation, recombination and selectionon fixed or 
deforming fitness landscapes, An adapting population flows over the landscape under these forces.  The 
structure of such landscapes, smooth or rugged, governs both the evolvability of populations and the sustained 
fitness of their members.  The structure of fitness landscapes inevitably imposes limitations on adaptive search.  
On smooth landscapes and a fixed population size and mutation rate, as the complexity of the entities under 
selection increases an error threshold is reachedthe population melts from the adaptive peaks and flows 
across vast reaches of genotype space among near neutral mutants.  Conversely on sufficiently rugged 
landscapes, the evolutionary process becomes trapped in very small regions of genotype spacethe results of 
this chapter suffice to say that selection can be unable to avoid spontaneous order.  The limitations on selection 
arise because of two inexorable complexity catastropheseach arises where the other does not.  One on rugged 
landscapes, trapping adaptive walks, the other on smooth landscapes where selection becomes too weak to hold 
adapting populations in small untypical regions of the space of possibilities.  Between them, selection is sorely 
pressed to escape the typical features of the system on which it operates. 
 
 Kauffman covers a great deal of ground here, not all of which can be fully recapitulated in a brief 
paper.  Again, Kauffmans Type II complexity catastrophe (which takes place on smooth or highly 
correlated landscapes) bears a strong resemblance to what Farmer describes as first order efficiency in 
financial markets with very thin arbitrage margins for technical traders.14  To earn extraordinary returns 
traders are forced to undertake wide searches, equivalent to highly leveraged positions. 
                                                
8 For a more complete description see Smith, Eric; Farmer, J. Doyne; Gillemot, Laszlo; and Krishnamurthy, Supriya Statistical 
Theory of the Continuous Double Auction, Santa Fe Institute Working Papers, October 20, 2002 
http://www.santafe.edu/sfi/publications/Working-Papers/02-10-057.pdf 
9 See Aoki, Masahiko, Subjective Game Models and the Mechanism of Institutional Change, Santa Fe Institute Workshop, 
http://www.santafe.edu/files/workshops/bowles/aokiIX.PDF 
10 Those unfamiliar with the mechanics of Boolean networks can obtain a very simple, straightforward explanation with examples 
from Torsten Reils An Introduction to Complex Systems, Department of Zoology, Oxford University at 
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~quee0818/complexity/complexity.html Vladimir Redko provides a slightly more mathematical treatment at 
http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/BOOLNETW.html 
11 Ibid. No. 4 
12 See, for example, Reaume, David Walras, complexity, and Post Walrasian Macroeconomics, Collander David, Ed. Beyond 
Microfoundations: Post Walrasian Macroeconomics, Cambridge University Press 1996 
13 The search property of organisms seeking maximal fitness levels allows one to draw some additional, strong conclusions about both 
organisms and landscapes. 
14 Ibid. No. 8, See also Zovko, Ilija and Farmer, J. Doyne, The Power of Patience: A behavioral regularity in limit order placement, 
Santa Fe Institute Working Papers, 02-06-27; Daniels, Marcus J.; Iori, Giulia; and Farmer, J. Doyne, Demand Storage, Liquidity, and 
Price Volatility Santa Fe Institute Working Papers, 02-01-001; and Farmer, J. Doyne and Joshi, Shareen, The Price Dynamics of 
Common Trading Strategies, in the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization October 30, 2001. 
 Kauffmans Type I complexity catastrophe is the result of the fundamental structure of NK Boolean 
fitness landscapes.  In a dynamic fitness landscape, as complexity increases, the heights of accessible peaks 
fall towards mean fitness. Again, in terms of financial markets we might compare this to the fact that over 
long periods of time the betas of all stocks in the market have a tendency to drift towards 1.15 
 Bill McKelvey takes the fitness landscape model well past being a metaphor for market evolution and 
decomposes Michael Porters value chain into value chain competencies as the parts of firms (the N of the 
NK network) and K as the connections of between the parts within a firm and the parts of the opponents.  
He models firm behavior using a heterogeneous16 stochastic microagent assumption, which then allows him 
to test four basic concepts: (1) What intrafirm levels of integrative complexity affect competitive 
advantage? (2) What levels of integrative complexity influence how rapidly 
firms in coevolutionary groups reach equilibrium fitness levels, if they do so? (3) What complexity factors 
might affect the competitive advantage (or height) of fitness levels? and (4) What levels of integrative 
complexity might affect the overall adaptive success of firms comprising a coevolving system?17 
 The formal structure of McKelveys question is every bit as important as the answers, some of 
which are provided in his work and some which are explained by the Windrum-Birchenhall model of 
technological diffusion which we discuss next.  McKelveys work serves two important purposes.  First, he 
develops a metric from Porters value chain which allows him to calculate actual scalar or vector values for 
different NK structures.  This also allows him to calculate fitness levels in terms of Nash Equilibria which 
vary directly as a function of N and K.18  Secondly, the values he derives from Porters value chain allow 
him to run simulations which specify under what conditions firms should either increase or decrease their 
internal and external connectivity.  While in many ways McKelvey is really just taking the first cut at the 
                                                
15 See Theobald, Michael and Yallup, Peter  Determining the Security Speed of Adjustment Coefficients, 
http://bss2.bham.ac.uk/business/papers/Theocoeff.pdf , May 2001.  See also Blake, David; Lehmann, Bruce N. and Timmerman, Allan 
Asset Allocation Dynamics and Pension Fund Performance, November, 1998 
http://econ.ucsd.edu/~atimmerm/pensrev2.pdf  
16 See (A) Farmer, J. Doyne Physicists Attempt to Climb the Ivory Towers of Finance, Computing in Science and Engineering, 
November-December, 1999 for an explanation of agent-based models.  See also W. Brian Arthurs classic game theoretic treatment of 
an interaction of agents which has no equilibrium and no possibility of satisfying every player either prospectively or retrospectively, 
the El Farol Bar Game, in (B) "Inductive Reasoning and Bounded Rationality", American Economic Review, May 1994, Vol. 84, No. 
2, pp. 406-411. Arthur also deals with the stochastic microagent assumption in(C) Arthur, W. Brian, "Learning and Adaptive 
Economic Behavior: Designing Economic Agents that Act Like Human Agents: A Behavioral Approach to Bounded Rationality", 
American Economic Review, Vol. 81, No. 2, May 1991, pp. 353-359. 
17 McKelvey, Bill Avoiding Complexity Catastrophe in Coevolutionary Pockets: Strategies for Rugged Landscapes, Organization 
Science, Vol. 10, No. 3, MayJune 1999.  McKelvey explains his use of Kauffmans model by noting that The biologist Stuart 
Kauffman suggests a theory of complexity catastrophe offering universal principles explaining phenomena normally attributed to 
Darwinian natural selection theory. Kauffmans complexity theory seems to apply equally well to firms in coevolutionary 
pockets. Based on complexity theory, four kinds of complexity are identified. Kauffmans NK[C] model is positioned at the edge 
of chaos between complexity driven by Newtonian simple rules and rule driven deterministic chaos. Kauffmans insight, which is 
the basis of the findings in this paper, is that complexity is both a consequence and a cause. Multicoevolutionary complexity in firms 
is defined by moving natural selection processes inside firms and down to a parts level of analysis, in this instance Porters value 
chain level, to focus on microstate activities by agents. 
18 Ibid., Kauffman argues that his NK[C] Boolean game model behaves like Boolean networks when agent outcomes are limited to 
0 or 1, the K number of interdependencies is taken as the number of inputs, and Nash equilibria in N person games are taken as 
equivalent to agents being trapped on local optima. In the NK Boolean game, fitness yields are assigned to the 0 or 1 actions by 
drawing from a uniform distribution ranging from 0.0 to 1.0. The K epistatic interdependencies that inhibit fitness yields from an 
agents actions are drawn from a fitness table in which fitness levels of each one-change nearest neighbor are assigned by drawing 
from a uniform distribution also ranging from 0.0 to 1.0. Kauffman points out that the complexity tuning effect occurs when 
increasing K reduces the height of local optima while also increasing their number. Thus, high K leads to complexity catastrophe.  In 
describing how K and C effects enter into the model, Kauffman says: 
. . . [F]or each of the N traits in species 2, the model will assign a random fitness between 0.0 and 1.0 for each combination of the K 
traits internal to species 2, together with all combinations of C traits in species 1. In short, we expand the random fitness table for each 
trait in species 2 such that the trait looks at its K internal epistatic inputs and also at the C external epistatic inputs from species 1 
(Kauffman 1993, p. 244). 
One might conclude from this that K and C are combined into one overall moderating effect on the fitness yield from an agents 
choice to adopt a higher fitness from a nearest-neighbor. Results of the models indicate otherwise. 
 As Kauffman points out (pp. 249, 254), the speed at which agents encounter Nash equilibria increases with K, and decreases as 
C and S increase. Thus, in these models K acts as a complexity forcing effect in speeding up the process of reaching stable Nash 
equilibria, whereas C acts as an antiforcing effect, as does S. Presumably K effects are averaged as per the basic NK model, leaving 
C and S effects (S multiplies the C effects) to modify fitness yields on an agents actions independently of K effects. The consequence 
is that increasing K tunes the landscape toward more ruggedness (increased numbers of less fit local optima), and increases the 
likelihood of agents being marooned on local optima. But increasing C and/or S prevents achieving Nash equilibrium by prolonging 
the coupled dancing, as Kauffman (1993, p. 243) calls it, in which opponents keep altering each others landscapes, keep the fitness 
search going, and thereby prevent stabilitythe more opponents there are, the more the instability persists. 
problem, he is doing so with rigorous statistical mechanics, so that even where his conclusions are not 
immediately overwhelming, they are profoundly accurate.  Even though we might not expect most firms to 
start using Kauffmans model in the immediate future (Kauffman did run a joint venture with Ernst and 
Young for several years, during which his primary purpose was to organize conferences and explain to 
clients the value and insights of his model)19 McKelveys advice, In general the simulations indicate that 
keeping ones internal and external coevolutionary interdependencies just below that of opponents can 
be expected to hold true for quite some time. 
 Having explored some of the tools of chaos and complexity theory for analyzing evolutionary 
dynamics, we can now turn to a remarkably compact model developed by Paul Windrum and Chris 
Birchenhall of the UK, which uses statistical mechanics and computer simulation to predict the detailed 
impact of technology change including nonlinearities such as network externalities and technology shocks. 
 
                                                
19 See Meyer, Chris Whats Under the Hood: A Laymans Guide to the Real Science, Ernst and Young/Cap Gemini Center for 
Business Innovation, http://www.cbi.cgey.com/events/pubconf/1996-07-19/proceedings/chapter%2010.pdf 
 
The Windrum-Birchenhall Model of Technological Diffusion by Punctuated 
Equilibrium with Quasi Homogenous Agent Groupsi  
 
 
Windrum and Birchenhall describe their basic model as employing (p. 1): 
 
simulation techniques on an agent-based model containing heterogeneous populations of adaptive users and 
suppliers that co-evolve over time. In the spirit of Nelson and Winter (1982), producers employ various 
adjustment rules to their production routines, while simultaneously innovating through a combination of 
imitation and internal R&D. Whereas Nelson and Winter modeled these using a replicator dynamic algorithm, 
the current paper employs a modified genetic algorithm in which imitation is conducted via a process of 
selective transfer (one-way crossover) and internal R&D is conducted via selective mutation. 
 
While they may have missed McKelveys technique of capturing the complete dynamics of heterogeneous 
agents, their model is otherwise remarkably eclectic, following the fundamental program of Nelson and 
Winter, incorporating Hollands genetic algorithm, and some approximation of Kauffmans N-1 mutation 
NK lattice structure.  As with Aoki (2000), Windrum and Birchenhall approach technology diffusion and 
substitution from the standpoint of a punctuated equilibrium.  They very carefully define the limits of their 
model, arguing that:  
 
Nelson and Winter (1982) argue for engagement in appreciative theorizing as an initial step in the process of 
developing formal models. One must be clear about what is, and is not, being modeled. As well as identifying a 
set of stylized facts which the model is expected to replicate  notably, in this case, the ability of a formal model 
to replicate substitutions by successive species with increasing fitness.ii 
 
Similarly, they explain that: 
 
 The basic conceptual and theoretical elements which form the core of the  model are drawn from Shys 
(1996) discussion of consumer substitution between network size and quality in sequential technology 
competitions.  In contrast to earlier papers by Farrell and Saloner (1985) and Katz and Shapiro (1986), 
the overlapping generations (OLG) model developed by Shy focuses on repeated technology adoptions. The 
model allows for different preferences between the old consumer type and the young consumer type, 
although preferences within each generation are assumed to be identical (i.e. homogeneous). 
 
While this does not provide as heterogeneous a group of agents as either Farmer (2001) or Arthur (2002) 
employ in their simulations, at least there are two different elements within the population, not unlike the 
players in Arthurs El Farol bar game.  From this basic framework, Windrum and Birchenhall attempt to 
realize three major goals: 
 
(1) The key question addressed by the model is whether (a) the young consumer type will treat quality and installed user 
networks as substitutes and, hence, select the later technology (which is de facto assumed to be of higher quality) or (b) 
alternatively treat them as complements, in which case they will select the old technology.  
 
(2) In this paper we address a number of issues that are black boxed by Shy but which are likely to have important 
implications for the general thrust of his argument. 
   
(a) The first issue is that of functional equivalence. A technological substitution involves the 
substitution of an established product or process by a new alternative that fulfils the same basic 
function (Grübler et al., 1988; Grübler, 1990). 
 
(b)  Second, there is the quality of alternative designs. The standard economics model of choice ties 
relative fitness to the\welfare associated alternative commodities. The economic literature contains 
some important precedents for an analytical treatment of how users first compare, and then rank, 
substitutable goods (e.g. Frenken, Saviotti and Trommetter, 1999).  
 
(c) A third issue is the trade-off between quality and price. A trade-off is likely to exist between the 
quality of the rival technologies and their price, tied to costs of producing these alternative bundles 
of characteristics. Given that user welfare depends on both the relative performance of each 
technology and their prices, this will affect demand and hence the outcome of a technological 
competition (Arthur, Ermoliev and Kaniovski,1987; Arthur, 1989).  
 
(d) Fourthly, we address is the existence of new types of users. This is likely to be a key factor affecting 
the complex dynamics of emergent market structures. 
 
Windrum and Birchenhall then argue that there is likely to be a number of factors influencing user 
preferences, and that these interact in a complex manner. Three factors in particular were highlighted 
above: (P. 4) 
 
(a) production costs 
(b) price  
(c) performance quality 
 
They formalize this relationship by assigning the following value to the probability of adopting the new 
technology B rather than the established technology A at time t : (P. 4) 
  
Pr { UA( xA) + vA (m-pA) < UB ( xB) + vB (m-pB) } 
where x is the characteristic vector of a technology design 
p is the price of that design 
V is the indirect utility of money that can be obtained in other markets 
 
They assume all other markets are fixed, and that the above function has a constant form. 
 
U(x) is the direct utility of consuming the good with characteristic vector x.  
 
[Note that the utility of not buying a good is V(m) and so a user will only accept  
offer (x, p) if ui(x) > Vi(m) - Vi(m-pi]  The conclusion which the authors draw, is, in fact, entirely 
consonant with Arthur, Ermoliev and Kaniovski: 
 
In the presence of heterogeneous preferences, a simple analytically tractable solution for equation (1) is 
unlikely to exist in all but the simplest of circumstances. Multiple equilibria solutions may exist in which it is 
impossible to predict ex ante whether there will be a technological substitution, a technological lock-out, or a 
mixed solution (i.e. a partial substitution with market sharing between the old and new technologies). First, 
multiple equilibria solutions can exist - even when the performance characteristics of one technology 
application are absolutely superior to those of another - if there is a high frequency of intermediate valuations 
within the user population. Second, rival technologies typically offer different relative strengths across a set of 
performance characteristics. Again, given heterogeneous preferences, it is impossible to predict ex ante whether 
a technological substitution will occur.  (P. 4) 
 
Their answer to this quandary is as follows: (p.5) 
 
One way of tackling the problem is to construct a simulation model in order to analyze the consequences of 
heterogeneous user preferences, and the co-evolutionary dynamics of changing user preferences and the 
innovative activities of competing suppliers. 
 
 It is here that Windrum and Birchenhall provide an agent-based iterative model with quasi-
heterogeneous agents representing both consumers and firms which co-evolve over time.  The model is 
adjusted so that it brings the groups to market in a random order and gets the groups to determine their 
demands and purchases.  It initiates the replicator dynamic for that period to redistribute the population 
across user groups, and it gets the suppliers to adjust their capacity, level of production and redesign their 
goods.   
 There now follow a welter of simplifying assumptions which lend this model what the authors term A 
Keynesian flavor.  These assumptions are well within the bounds of good modeling, but they steal much 
of the potential non-linear richness away from the model.  On the other hand, they eliminate virtually all 
of the noise of real market data, which allows the authors to carefully study the mutation and co-
evolution process, something which might otherwise be obscured by market complexity .iii   The greatest 
degree of heterogeneity among agents is lost in the simplification of the  pricing model.  Its specifications 
are that: (p. 5) 
 
There are M user groups. Associated with group i = 1M, a utility function ui is defined over the offer space, 
namely the Cartesian product X·P of design space X and the price space P (positive real numbers) of the form: 
  Ui(x,p) = ∑k αikvk(xk) + βiw(m - p) = αiv(x) + βiw(m - p)  
 
 Here m is the budget of the user and is assumed to be the same for all users. The term βiw(m - p)  is the 
indirect utility obtained by spending the residual budget in other markets. All users in the same group are 
assumed to adopt the same utility function. Each supplier offers to sell a good with some design x at some price 
p. Users use these utility functions to rank alternative offers and as a measure of well-being. Note that users 
always have the option of not accepting any of the offers and may keep all of their budget for use elsewhere. 
The utility of this option is βiw (m) and will be called the null utility. It can be seen that the utility functions 
differ across groups only in having different values for the coefficients αi and βi. 
 
Another simplification is the component function: (p. 5) 
 
“Currently we use a simple square root function for the component functions, i.e. 
           __               _ 
 vk(xk) = √xk      and               w(m-p) = √(m- p)  
 
The population of users in each period is G and a form of the replicator dynamics described below governs the 
distribution across the M groups.  Let Git be the number of users of type i  at time t. We use the subscript t only 
when necessary to distinguish between periods. In each period supplier j offers a quantity Qj of a particular 
design-price combination (xj, pj).  After suppliers have posted these offers, user groups appear in the market in 
a random order.  Let I (i), with i=1,..,M, be a permutation of the indices 
 {1,.., M} so that I(1) is the first group to come to market. Note that this permutation will differ from period to 
period. Given the utility function UI(1) associated with this group, the users rank the offers (xj, pj) in descending 
order of preference.   
 
Let J(j) j = 0,1,..,M represent this ranking, so that J(j) is a permutation of {0, 1,..,M}, where 0 represents the 
null offer, i.e. buy none of the goods. If the null offer (J(0) = 0) is best, the users in that group exit the market 
without buying anything. If the supplier ranked highest by the users has an offer which dominates the null offer 
(i.e. J(0) > 0) then all users in that group will post a demand for one unit of that offer. If supplier J(0) has 
produced a sufficient quantity of the good (i.e. Qj(0) ≥ GI(1)) then all these demands will be converted into sales, 
all users in the group exit the market and the available quantity of the good is reduced by the volume of sales, 
i.e. QJ(0)⇐QJ(0) − GI(1)            (p. 6) 
 
If demand exceeds supply (i.e. QJ(0) < GI(1)) then QJ(0) demands are converted into sales, QJ(0) of the user leave 
the market and the available quantity of the good becomes zero and the remaining users G1 − QJ(0) consider their 
next best option J(1). The interaction of these remaining users with this offer is identical to interaction with J(0). 
If J(1) = 0 they leave the market, otherwise they post demands for the goods and these are met fully or partly 
depending on the quantity QJ(1) on offer. This process for group I(1) continues until all users in the group have 
left the market. Group I(2) enters the market and interacts with suppliers in the same way apart from the fact 
that the quantities available to this group will be reduced by any sales made to group I(1) users. This continues 
until all groups have entered and left the market. When group I(i), i > 1, enters the market the quantities 
available will be the Qjs minus any sales made to user groups I(k) for k=1,.., i-1.   (p. 6) 
 
After this process in period t each user group will have attained an average level of utility Wit.  This is the 
average utility of the users in the group after they have consumed any good bought in this market. Note that all 
users will attain a utility no less than the null utility and thus Wit will be no less than the null utility.  (p. 6) 
 
The preceding step is a nice simplification on the part of the authors, guaranteeing (albeit a tad 
unrealistically) that no user sacrifices utility.  They next incorporate the parameters for the situation when 
demand exceeds supply: 
 
If demand exceeds supply (i.e. QJ(0) < GI(1)) then QJ(0) demands are converted into sales, QJ(0) of the user leave the 
market and the available quantity of the good becomes zero and the remaining users G1 − QJ(0) consider their next 
best option J(1). The interaction of these remaining users with this offer is identical to interaction with J(0). If J(1) 
= 0 they leave the market, otherwise they post demands for the goods and these are met fully or partly depending 
on the quantity QJ(1) on offer. This process for group I(1) continues until all users in the group have left the market. 
Group I(2) enters the market and interacts with suppliers in the same way apart from the fact that the quantities 
available to this group will be reduced by any sales made to group I(1) users. This continues until all groups have 
entered and left the market. When group I(i), i > 1, enters the market the quantities available will be the Qjs minus 
any sales made to user groups I(k) for k=1,.., i-1.  After this process in period t each user group will have attained 
an average level of utility Wit.  This is the average utility of the users in the group after they have consumed any 
good bought in this market. Note that all users will attain a utility no less than the null utility and thus Wit will be 
no less than the null utility.       (p. 6) 
 
The authors then calculate the new distribution for the next iteration as follows: 
 
Let     ρit   =  Git  ,  where G is the total population, be the proportion of the user   
 G population in the ith group.  Given these utilities, a new     
 distribution, ρit+1  is calculated as : 
 
   ρit+1    =     ρitrWit       
         ∑k ρktrWkt 
 
 Where r is the factor determining the strength of the replicator  effect of the differing utilities.  Groups with 
above average utilities grow larger and groups with below average utility decline, i.e., they have a negative growth 
rate. (p. 6) 
 
 The authors work out similar dynamics for suppliers, including prices, profits, wealth and capacity.  
While some of these parameters are rather simplistic, the model almost certainly gains more in clarity of 
exposition than it loses in relationship to real market complexity.  On the whole, the sum of these 
simplifications and linearization is, in the authors own words to produce a model of production that is 
distinctly Keynesian in flavor as adjustments to excess demand occur primarily through changes in output 
and production capacity rather than price.  Having hopefully addressed any further objections, it is 
interesting to note that Japans economy recovery in 1932-36 was based on the Keynesian macro-policies 
of Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo, and that in looking at institutional evolution with punctuated 
equilibrium, a Keynesian model may offer some distinctly Japanese advantages.iv 
 The most interesting part of this model is not, however, the elegant construction of supply and demand 
or even the welfare function.  What is truly a masterful achievement here is that because the variation 
among some rather ordinary (and one would hope, rather well understood) features of the model have been 
artificially dampened, the process of innovation, in this case modeled with an increasing fitness 
replacement function allows the authors to demonstrate (much in the fashion of Arthur, Ermoliev and 
Kaniovski demonstrating large differences in outcome arising from small stochastic perturbations of the 
system) the powerful effects of a punctuated equilibrium on overall fitness, even though any individual 
change is both small and random.  The mutation process is executed in two stages. This facilitates the 
adaptation process. During the first stage, each of the suppliers considers mutations: 
 
Mutations are carried out in isolation of other suppliers. Given design x for the jth supplier period t, the supplier 
considers a mutated design x*. Each component x*i mutates with probability µ and if it does mutate it has the 
value xi +κε, where κ is a mutation factor and ε is a random number drawn from a standard normal distribution. 
The mutated design replaces the current design only if it increases the utility of the suppliers target user type.  
After mutation, suppliers consider further innovation based on imitation of rival suppliers.  Each supplier picks 
another supplier in a biased random draw from the existing set of suppliers. This selection is biased toward to the 
more profitable suppliers. In fact it is based on Goldbergs roulette wheel in that the probability of supplier j 
being selected is proportional to the profit made by the supplier j in the current period. Having selected a rival, the 
supplier creates a new candidate design x* by transferring part of the rival's design xr to replace the matching 
elements of its current design. A random set H of characteristics is selected, as shown:v 
 
xh* = xrh for  ∈ H   and x*h   and  xh* = xh for  ∉ H. 
 
 This selective transfer operator is different to crossover in genetic algorithms. Here there is no mutual 
exchange of elements, selective transfer is a one-way emulation. Hence the supplier that is being emulated 
does not have to adjust its design as a consequence of this operator. The new design x* replaces the current 
design x only if this increases the utility of the target user type. (p. 8)The authors then introduce a 
technology shock into the system: 
 
There  is a technological shock at period T1. This shock has three features. First, the characteristic space 
qualitatively changes, i.e. the set of characteristics associated with the new technology application differs from 
that of the old technology. More specifically, prior to time T1, the characteristic space has characteristics 
dimensions 1 to h1.  After T1, the characteristic has dimensions h2 to h, where 1 ≤ h2 ≤ h1<h   Furthermore, 
before T1 there is a limit xmax on characteristic values. We use D1 and D2 to represent the design spaces before 
and after T1 respectively. Before T1 all designs must belong to D1 and users place positive weight on IS 
application characteristics 1 to h1 and zero weights on characteristics h1+1 to h.  Second, whereas suppliers prior 
to T1 are producers of the old technology, after T1 all market entrants are new technology producers. At the 
same time, the user groups that emerge after T1 are new technology users. New generations of users and 
suppliers are generated in the following way; at T1 dead suppliers and dead user types are replaced by new 
generations of suppliers and user types. A supplier is treated as dead if its market share has fallen below a cut-
off value and a user type is dead if its share of the user population has fallen below a cut-off value. The new 
suppliers created at time T1 must provide designs in D2. New user types place positive weight on IS application 
characteristics h2 to h and zero weight on characteristics 1 to h1-1. Third, picking up on the earlier discussion of 
the possible importance of the relative rate of falling unit costs due to static and dynamic economies of scale, 
the cost of production for new technologies is reduced by a factor θ, i.e. after T1 all γk are reduced by a factor 
θ. (p. 9) 
 
 Using a quasi-random number generator for each successive run, organized by a batch control process, 
they proceed to test whether the model can actually produce adaptive results with an overall higher fitness 
level.  They argue that we believe overallthe model does indeed produce the patterns associated with 
technological substitutions within a market niche.  The envelope of aggregate utility is raised as the new 
technology displaces the old technology in the market niche.  A substitution occurs when a new, fitter 
technology (i.e., one offering higher levels of welfare) displaces and older, less fit technology (i.e., one 
offering lower levels of welfare). (p. 9) 
  While these results shouldnt really surprise anyone who understand the values and constraints 
imposed by the rules (perhaps the proper term here is meta-strategies or meta-behaviors),  there were 
two very interesting results from this study, which equilibrium economic models might not capture well, if 
at all.  In one case a new technology replaced an old technology and the user base was also replaced with 
new users.  One might compare this process to the substitution of entertainment professionals, stars, or to 
the shift from Vinyl and tape to CD, or even the interesting example of Encyclopedia Britannica being 
replaced by Microsoft public domain content software (Evans and Wurster, 1997). 
 The second set of novel results found new technologies replacing older technologies, but this time the 
technology went to the established user base.  While a complete explanation for this phenomenon is not 
provided, the authors appear to have tested their variables, as well as the substitutability of variables as far 
as they could, with the considerable resources at their disposal.  They then conclude that what drives the 
model is the replicator dynamics and the utility of the targeted group.  While co-evolution, or simultaneous 
deformation of the fitness landscape is not undertaken (in that sense this is a static, multiple iteration model 
rather than a dynamical systems model) the authors do raise some interesting issues about the potential 
value of technology change when they conclude, Type A substitution tends to occur if a new Type Two 
firm can quickly generate design and price combination that would make its targeted Type Two customers 
better off than the current dominant Type One firm-consumer alliance.  (p. 11) 
 The implications for industrial policy as well as corporate strategy are that first mover advantages play 
a crucial role in technology substitution, but that they are emergent and not discernible below a certain 
threshold of market penetration (Modis, 1998).  However, both the Windrum Birchenhall technology 
replacement model and the combinatorial market landscape approach suggest that markets and consumers 
need to be tolerant of new product entrants or new product categories if they expect to raise overall 
welfare, particularly if the expected mechanism of national prosperity is characterized as a punctuated 
equilibrium Aoki, (1997, 1998C).  These findings, curiously enough, have a bit of the flavor of the 
Chicago School treatment of consumption and production insofar as they argue that value clusters are 
built from the ground up, often using local rules of  behavior (Holland, 1995, Kauffman 1995, Aoki, 
1995B). 
 Similarly, this line of analysis suggests that while new technologies may offer potentially high returns 
to scale and scope, the operating environment at the firm level  needs to be flexible and capable of rapid 
adaptation in order to capture the gains which a high degree of innovation can provide (Lissack, 1996, 
2000).  In this sense, one might argue generically that in order to optimize returns, the organization must 
imitate the product.  Michael Porter argues convincingly that for many industries, corporate strategy needs 
a time-line of a decade or more in order to establish a unique strategic position based on internal cross 
subsidization (Porter, 1997).  However, in fields where the product life cycle runs from six to eighteen 
months (as it does in the case of microprocessors and many other high technology, high value-added 
products) a different kind of model than the traditional five forces or value cluster model is required 
(Slater and Olson, 2002).  
 However, the mid-twentieth century dynamics of the Chicago school (if one can properly characterize 
any of this work as dynamics at all) are insufficient to characterize the relationship between government 
and regulation to the production function of the firm.  Indeed this kind of analysis is far better suited to 
treatments of relatively homogenous consumer preferences, which can then be aggregated as an overall 
welfare function.   
 On the other hand, the policy message of the non-linear models discussed above (primarily the NK 
fitness model, as applied through evolutionary walks on a hypercube of competitive product and state 
spaces as represented by replicator dynamics) argues that if government policy doesnt support superior 
technologies and leading edge sectors, then the countrys entire technology base may ultimately be at risk 
in the long run.  This conclusion is a relatively strong rejection of the efficient market hypothesis, insofar as 
the empirical level demonstrates rather large information asymmetries across buyers, sellers, consumers, 
producers and inventors in the area of new technology. 
 At the firm level, management in general and top management in particular, needs to exercise an 
especially sensitive degree of restraint before sidelining or dropping new technology products (Modis 
1998).  Another broad recommendation which comes out of this research is that to be competitive in future 
markets, large organizations, including large multinational corporations will need to become less 
hierarchical, less vertically integrated and to adopt more flexible organizational structures if they are to 
avoid becoming trapped on local fitness landscape maxima.  In recent years, a new subfield of 
organizational behavior, perhaps best described as organizational complexity which focuses on just such 
problems.   
 Again, one of the most important conclusions of this group of researchers is that in the 21st century, 
organizations will need to decentralize and move away from more traditional divisional structures and 
hierarchical control if they are to survive on the emerging technology landscape (Slater and Olson, 1992).  
A number of new techniques have been designed to address this problem, including simulated annealing, 
organizational patches and NK fitness measures of organizational interconnectedness (Lissack, 
McKelvey, 1999, Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2001, and Frenken and Valente, 2002).  Firms which cannot adapt 
their internal structure to the new dynamics of technological competition are not likely to prosper, nor 
indeed survive in the turbulent years to come (Evans and Wurster, 1997). 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix:  Internal Structure of the Genetic Algorithm  Jonathan Vos Post 
 
 One thing I found, well ahead of Koza and other researchers, through my experiments in 1975-1977, at 
the University of  Massachusetts at Amherst, where I beta-tested John Holland's book "Complexity in 
Natural and Artificial Systems" by coding the Genetic Algorithm into APL and running evolution of 
software was as follows:  
 
The evolving software must implicitly determine HOW rugged the fitness landscape is, and adapt its 
mutation rate, cross-over rate, and inversion rate accordingly.  
 
 My insight beyond that notion was to explicitly add genes that set mutation rate, cross-over rate, and 
inversion rate right at the end of (as it turned out, location didn't much matter) the existing genes.  That is, I 
put meta-variables which coded for parameters of the Genetic Algorithm itself in among the variables 
coded for the underlying evolving system.  
 
 I then ran the Genetic Algorithm with the extended "chromosomes" on landscapes of different 
ruggedness.  As I'd hoped, the 3 types of mutation rates themselves evolved to good rates that fit the rates 
optimum for adaptation on that degree and style of ruggedness.  
 
 This proved, at least to my satisfaction, that the Genetic Algorithm was not only parallel as explicitly 
obvious, and parallel in its operation on the higher-dimensional superspace of possible gene-sequences, as 
Holland demonstrated (in his example where a binary string of 0-1 alleles was part of the subspace of 
trinary strings of 0-1-"don't care" so that spaces of dimension 2-to-the-power-of-N in which evolution 
occurred were faithfully sampling and implicitly evolving in superspaces of dimension 3-to-the-power-of-
N, where N is the bit-length of the evolving "chromosome"), but parallel at yet a higher level, namely that 
the Genetic Algorithm worked at simultaneously evolving the parameters of its own operation in rugged 
landscapes while evolving the simulated organisms that had their fitness determined by that same 
landscape.  My analogy was to "hypervariable" genes in the immune system.   
 
 With the infinitely greater computational power and speeds available today, this experiment should, in 
principle, be repeatable in a multi-generational context which should then allow for the testing of emergent 
order for global evaluation functions.  Until now, evolutionary simulations have been based either on the 
genetic algorithm20 or similar structures or else using assumptions that finesse the questions of how global 
evaluation emerges at all and simply proceeds to use global criteria in a purely local environment.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
20 Holland, John and Mimnaugh, Heather, Hidden Order, Perseus Publishing, 1996 
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v Chris Meyer (1996) explain this kind of evolutionary mechanism in terms of a kitchen chair with variable features, seat, back, arm-
rest, etc. which can be made with either wood or plastic and which have a higher fitness if one material is used rather than another.  In 
order to explain how changing the configuration, or mutation improves fitness and how small random walks can produce large 
changes in position, he begins with a Boolean hypercube as an evolutionary fitness mapping mechanism.  As Chris Meyer explains 
The majority of Kauffmans talk centered on the mathematical models used by complexity scientists to depict what biologists call 
fitness landscapes. Adaptation is usually thought of as a process of hill climbing through minor variations toward peaks of high 
fitness on a fitness landscape, Kauffman wrote in At Home in the Universe. And natural selection is thought of as pulling an 
adapting population toward such peaks.  We can imagine a mountain range on which populations of organisms (or in this case, 
programs) are feeling their way to the summits.  Depending on whether it is beneficial, a random change in the genome (the computer 
code) puts a mutant higher or lower on the terrain. The search problem is compounded by the fact that the evolving population cannot 
actually see the contours of the landscape. There is no way to soar above and see a Gods eye view.  We can think of the population as 
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Boolean hypercube and the NK model. While these models are mere beginnings, they already yield clues about the power and limits 
of natural selection, he explained in his book. In his lecture, he said, Im going to show you how they give us the tools to think about 
such features in economic systems as learning curves of the kind that Michael Rothschild was talking about yesterday. In short, I think 
we can think about a lot of things about technological innovation, just based on the notion of a hard combinatorial optimization 
problem.  To introduce the concept of a Boolean hypercube, he said, lets think about a chair made of four parts. It has a back, seat, 
legs, and arms. And suppose that the parts come in two flavors, say, wood or plastic. That means there are 24or 16possible kind 
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are wood or plastic. If you Figure look at a Boolean Hypercube, you see that each of these chair part options can be assigned to a 
                                                                                                                                            
vertex on the Boolean hypercube.  Kauffman then introduced two concepts associated with the Boolean hypercube fitness landscape:  
combinatorial objects and one-mutant neighbors. All of the options you present on a Boolean hypercube are defined as combinatorial 
objects because they show the symbolic relationships between discrete mathematical elements belonging to a finite set.  The concept 
of a one-mutant neighbor is used to evaluate whether changing between two associated options on the landscapechanging the chair 
back from wood to plastic, for examplewould make the end result fitter. Boolean hypercubes are set up so that if you first located 
the wood chair back, its alternative mutant, the plastic chair back, would be found on a neighboring vertex.  Fit and Functional 
Effectiveness Whether Im talking about peptides or chairs, I need a notion of the fit and the functional effectiveness of the entity, 
Kauffman explained. Suppose I think of the affinity of a peptide for the estrogen receptor as the fitness of that peptide for binding the 
estrogen receptor. Or I think of the comfort of the chair. . . the fitness of the chair for my derriere. The simplest way to assess the 
fitness of the fictional chair is to rank order the options, from the worst chair to the best chair. In Kauffmans scale, one was the worst 
and 16 was the best. Kauffman assigned the numbers randomly. Once the fitness of each chair option was established, Kauffman took 
us on an adaptive walk. The term aptly describes the process complexity scientists use to evaluate the fitness of alternative 
optionsin this case, chair comforton a fitness landscape.  I start somewherefor example, at the worst chair or peptideand I 
look in every direction and the rule of the game is, if my neighbor is better than me, I get to go there. So, Im going to put an arrow 
pointing in the direction that is uphill, up the fitness landscape, where youre trying to go up to get better. And that orients all of these 
edges with arrows. The simplest thing you could do is start somewhere and follow the arrows from tail to head and what happens is, 
pretty soon you get to some spot where you cant go up any further, he continued.  Youre at a local peak on the landscape.  There 
were three local peaks on our chair fitness landscape. Its important to know how many peaks there are when youre evaluating a 
fitness landscape, as well as how many steps it takes to climb up to them. You dont have to be a rocket scientist to realize that as you 
go uphill, the number of directions uphill dwindles somehow. To say that the directions uphill dwindle means that as you go uphill, 
its getting harder and harder and harder to find a way to improve, Kauffman explained. And thats going to underlie big chunks of 
learning curves.  Real World Landscapes Arent Random The problem with the first fitness landscape Kauffman demonstrated using 
the Boolean hypercube, he explained, is that its the simplest case, because its the hardest case: its a random landscape. In the real 
world, nearby points typically are similar heights. Landscapes arent random. In At Home in the Universe, he writes: No complex 
entity that has evolved has done so on a random fitness landscape. Things capable of evolvingmetabolic webs of molecules, single 
cells, multicellular organisms, ecosystems, economic systems, peopleall live and evolve on landscapes that themselves have a 
special property: they allow evolution to work.  These real fitness landscapes, the types that underlie Darwins gradualism, are 
correlated. Nearby points tend to have similar heights. The high points are easier to find, for the terrain offers clues about the best 
direction to proceed. 
